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The paper presents an econometric study of the two bank ratings assigned by Moody's Investors 
Service. According to Moody’s methodology, foreign-currency long-term deposit ratings are as-
signed on the basis of Bank Financial Strength Ratings (BFSR), taking into account “external bank 
support factors” (joint-default analysis, JDA). Models for the (unobserved) external support are 
presented, and we find that models based solely on public information can reasonably well approx-
imate the ratings. It appears that the observed rating degradation can be explained by growth of the 
banking system as a whole. Moody’s has a special approach for banks in developing countries and 
Russia in particular. The models help reveal the factors that are important for external bank sup-
port. 
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 Tässä  keskustelualoitteessa  tutkitaan ekonometrisesti, miten Moody’s Investor Service 
antaa pankeille riskiluokituksia. Pankkien pitkäaikaisille valuuttatalletuksille annetaan luo-
kituksia Bank Financial Strength Ratings -metodin perusteella. Tämä metodi ottaa huomi-
oon myös mahdollisen ulkopuolisen tuen pankille. Tutkimuksessa tälle mahdolliselle julki-
selle tuelle löydetään malli, joka selittää riskiluokitukset varsin hyvin. Pankkijärjestelmän 
kasvu selittää riskiluokitusten heikkenemisen. Moody’sillä on erilainen lähestymistapa ke-
hittyvissä talouksissa toimivien pankkien riskiluokituksia määriteltäessä, ja tämä korostuu 
Venäjän ollessa kyseessä.  
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1  Introduction 
 
The credit ratings of Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch play a key role in the pricing 
of credit risk. This role will be further expanded with implementation of the Basel-2 Ac-
cord, which requires rating estimations of bank partners' credit risk. 
These ratings are especially important for banks in developing countries, since eco-
nomic agents there do not have long experience with the market economy and so are not 
highly experienced in estimating risks. There are in fact few firms in these countries that 
have ratings by the international rating agencies. For example, at the end of 2007, only 84 
of 1135 Russian banks had Moody’s ratings (about 120 had at least one rating by an inter-
national rating agency). 
In our paper we build econometric models of Moody’s bank ratings, using only 
publicly available information. Since there are not enough observations on Moody’s rat-
ings of Russian banks for the purpose of econometric modelling, we use a large sample of 
international banks (incl. Russian banks) in order to achieve model identification. The idea 
is that we can design a model based on a large international data set and tailor it to Russia 
with the relatively small data set that we have for Russia. 
According to Moody’s methodology [Moody’s (2007a,b)], Foreign-currency long-
term deposit ratings (DR) are assigned on the basis of Bank Financial Strength Ratings 
(BFSR), taking into account “external banks support factors” (joint-default analysis, JDA). 
We design models for both ratings. 
Such models could be used to answer the following questions: 
 
•  To what extent can the ratings be approximated using only public information. What is 
the forecasting power of the rating models? 
•  Does ratings “degradation” actually occur over time? 
•  Does Moody’s have a special approach for banks in developing countries (Russia, in 
particular)? 
•  Is it possible to construct a model for the “external bank support factors” that Moody’s 
takes into account in determining deposit ratings? What bank financial indicators and ma-
croeconomic factors are important for external support? 
 Anatoly Peresetsky and Alexander Karminsky 
 




In practice, such models could be used by banks (in implementing the Basel-2 IRB 
approach) and by bank supervision authorities (as part of an Early Warning System, EWS), 
especially in developing countries, where there are still many banks without ratings. 
There exists a vast literature on econometric models of ratings. Altman and Saun-
ders (1998) includes a review of the approaches to modelling credit risk. The seminal pa-
per by Altman and Rijken (2004) uses rating models to study the observed  stability of rat-
ings. Soest et al. (2003) were the first to model the ratings of Russian banks. Blume et al. 
(1998) use models to demonstrate “rating degradation” and find that rating standards have 
become more stringent in terms of the specific variables used in their study. By contrast, 
Amato and Furfine (2004) argue that this finding is overturned when account is taken of 
systematic changes in risk measures. 
In 2007 Moody’s introduced a new JDA (joint-default analysis) approach for as-
signing the Foreign-currency long-term deposit rating (DR) on the basis of Bank Financial 
Strength Ratings (BFSR), taking into account “external bank support factors” (Moody’s, 
2007a,b). 
Moody's Bank Financial Strength Ratings (BFSR) represent Moody's opinion of a 
bank's intrinsic safety and soundness. Assigning a BFSR is the first step in Moody's bank 
credit rating process. BFSR is a measure of the likelihood that a bank will require assis-
tance from third parties such as its owners, its industry group, or official institutions, in or-
der to avoid a default. BFSR do not take into account the probability that the bank will re-
ceive such external support, nor do they address the external risk that sovereign actions 
may interfere with a bank's ability to honor its domestic or foreign currency obligations. 
DR (deposit rating) — as a view of relative credit risk — incorporates the Bank Financial 
Strength Rating as well as Moody's expert opinion of any external support. 
We use our models to reveal which public information is helpful in forecasting “ex-
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2  Data  
 
The dataset consists of financial indicators from publicly available bank balance sheets of 
banks from 42 developed (DEV = 0) and developing (DEV = 1) countries for the period 
2002–2005. Moody’s bank ratings for these banks are available for the period 2003–2006. 
Overall there are about 1000 observations on some 380 banks. Fig. 1 presents the distribu-
tion of banks in the dataset which have BFSR over regions. The distribution resembles that 
for all banks except that North American banks are not included in the data.  
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The distribution of banks over BFSR rating categories is presented at the Fig. 2. Two mod-
es in the histogram can be explained by heterogeneous development of bank systems. 
Banks in developed countries generally have high ratings, the benefit of publishing low 
ratings being ambiguous. This contrasts with the situation in developing countries, where 
any rating by an international rating agency is a good sign. Due to country ceilings, most of 
banks from developing countries have BFSR ratings below D+. 
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Correspondence between BFSR (E to A) and DR (B3 to Aaa) ratings in the world on Janu-
ary 2007 is presented in table 1. Each cell in the table gives the number of banks with the Anatoly Peresetsky and Alexander Karminsky 
 




corresponding pair of ratings categories. Since most of banks were concentrated along the 
diagonal, one is inclined to conclude that BFSR determines DR on the whole. However, 
some banks are concentrated above the diagonal, which means that some banks have DR 
ratings higher than BFSR ratings due to external bank support factors. 
For model estimation, we use ordinal numerical scales for ratings from 12 to 0 for 
RFSR and from 15 to 0 for DR. Zero corresponds to the higher rating category.  
 
Table 1  Correspondence between BFSR and DR ratings in the world 
    A A– B+  B B– C+  C C– D+  D D– E+ E 
Aaa  6  1  1  2  3  2  1   1  
Aa1   8  2 4 2    3 3 2 1      
Aa2     28  16  2 2 6 2 1   1     
Aa3     2  48  18 15 11 9  8         
A1         36  15 13 11 16  1  1     
A2         2  83  23 19 16  6  7     
A3           1  72  15 17 10 10  2   
Baa1       1  4  24  13 6 5  1   
Baa2          18  10 14 12 11   
Baa3          8  5 4 3 1 
Ba1                 3  5  6  2  
Ba2               4  4  11  6 6  
Ba3            1 2 2 9 3  24  10 1 
B1               1  9  7  5  26  3 
B2                   1 2 39  3 
B3             1  3  16   
 
The financial indicators in the dataset and their descriptive statistics and correlations are 
presented in tables 5–7 in the Appendix. Financial indicators are grouped with respect to 
Moody’s methodology (Moody’s, 2007a). The main groups are: size of the bank, capital 
adequacy, profitability, efficiency, asset quality (table 6). For each group, the indicators are 
highly correlated, which is why it is not reasonable include all of them in the models. 
In addition to the bank financial indicators, the following variables were included in 
the models: 
•  Dummy variables: indicators of whether the bank belongs to the developing market 
(DEV = 1) and RUS = 1 if the bank is from Russia (therefore for bnk from Russia DEV = 
RUS = 1).  
•  Dummy variables for years D03–D05 for observations on financial indicators for 
2003–2005  
•  Corruption perceptions index from Transparency International agency (2007), TI CPI  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




•  Volatility of the country's economic growth; VOLAT takes values from 1 to 5; the in-
dex is calculated according to Moody’s methodology from sample standard deviation of a 
country's nominal GDP growth for the last 20 years. 
 
 
3  Models 
 
In this section, the two ratings (DR, BFSR) will be explained in terms of a small set of 
bank characteristics, time dummies and country-specific variables. Since a rating is a qua-
litative ordinal variable, the natural choice for ratings analysis is a model of ordered re-
sponse (ordered logit). See Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) for the first application of that model 
to bond ratings. We use White-Huber standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. In 
selecting a model, the main criteria were economic interpretation and certain statistical cri-
teria: Akaike criterion, pseudo-R
2, and t-statistics.  
Preliminary examination of the gaps between the time of actual rating observation 
and the time of observation of bank financial indicator reveals an “optimal” time gap of 18 
months. (6, 12, 18, 24 months gaps were considered as candidates). 
In table 2, two models for each of the two ratings are presented. The same set of re-
gressors was selected for the two models, since in the next section these models are used 
for modelling external support. Bank financial performance indicators included in the 
models are presented in table 6 in the Appendix. As one can see from table 7, financial in-
dicators for the same group are usually highly correlated, which is why only 1 or 2 of them 
are included in the model.  
 
Table 2  Models for DR and BFSR 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   DR  DR  BFSR  BFSR 
    Natural Quantile Natural Quantile 
Year 2003  D03    0.586*** 
  (0.153) 
  0.192 
 (0.154) 
  0.571*** 
 (0.158) 
  0.005 
 (0.156) 








Year 2005  D05    1.332*** 
 (0.320) 
  0.162 
 (0.319) 
  1.552*** 
 (0.321) 
  0.133 
 (0.364) 




  2.058*** 
 (0.350) 
  2.322*** 
 (0.312) 
Russia  RUS    0.256 
 (0.232) 
  0.261 
(0.208) 
  2.827*** 
 (0.394) 
  2.176*** 
 (0.341) Anatoly Peresetsky and Alexander Karminsky 
 




Volatility of economic growth  VOLAT –0.036 
 (0.074) 






















Customer Deposits / Shareholders’ Eq-
uity 
D_EQ    0.144*** 
 (0.015) 
  3.094*** 
 (0.295) 
  0.103*** 
 (0.016) 
  1.419*** 
 (0.329) 
Shareholders’ Equity (%) Total Assets  EQ_TA    0.088*** 
 (0.022) 
  2.980*** 
 (0.455) 
  0.031 
 (0.023) 
  0.255 
 (0.473) 
Problem Loans (%) Gross Loans  PL_GL    0.012 
 (0.010) 
  0.596* 
 (0.313) 
  0.087*** 
 (0.025) 
  1.941*** 
 (0.336) 
Personnel Expenses (%) Operation In-
come 
PE_OI    1.451** 
 (0.615) 
  0.019 
 (0.239) 
  4.737*** 
 (0.910) 
  1.159*** 
 (0.292) 
Interest expense (%) Avg interest bear-
ing liabilities 
CIBL    0.386*** 
 (0.074) 
  1.753*** 
 (0.622) 
  0.407*** 
 (0.101) 
  2.960*** 
 (0.788) 










Interest Expense (%) Interest Income  IE_II  –0.0070 
 (0.0058) 
  1.020** 
 (0.518) 
  0.0058 
 (0.0088) 
  0.599 
 (0.590) 
Pseudo-R
2  0.254 0.242 0.385 0.367 
*,**, and *** — significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Standard errors in brackets 
 
Models 1 and 2 are for DR rating. Model 1 uses the initial bank data and model 2 the quan-
tile scales for bank financial indicators. To construct a quantile scale for the bank-specific 
variable x we use share of banks in the sample for the given year t with values of variable x 
smaller than that of xit for the given bank i. That is, in quantile scale regressions, we use 
(| it it ) x PX x y e a r t =< = %  instead of xit. Thus, in the regression in quantile scales, bank-
specific variables reflect the relative position of the given bank in the banking system in 
the given year with respect to the corresponding variable. 
Time dummies are positive and significantly different from zero in models 1 and 3 
in natural scales. Moreover, the coefficient of the time dummy increases with time (e.g. 
0.586, 0.660, and 1.332 for 2003, 2004 and 2005 in model 1). This means that, if a bank 
keeps its financial indicators constant over time, it gets a lower rating in 2005 than in 2002 
(rating degradation). Consistent with the finding in Karminsky and Peresetsky (2007), the 
time dummies are insignificant in models 2 and 4 in the quantile scales. That is, if a bank 
keeps constant its relative position in the banking system, its rating does not change. This 
means that rating degradations observed in models 1 and 3 simply reflect the advancement 
of the banking system as whole. If a bank does not show “improvement” against a back-
ground of general “improvement” of other banks, then its rating gets degraded. And if e.g. 
a bank grows in size at the same rate as the size of the banking system grows and the bank 
keeps its relative position in the system, its rating does not change. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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However, the goodness of fit measure pseudo-R
2 is higher for models with natural 
scales (models 1 and 3) then for models with quantile scales (models 2 and 4), and there-
fore we use the models in natural variables below. 
Both ratings are higher for large banks. Ratings are lower for banks with high ratios 
of customer deposits to shareholders’ equity, since that ratio increases with risk. Poor qual-
ity of loans (problem loans as % of gross loans) also lower the ratings. Inefficiency (high 
personnel expenses) lowers the ratings. Capitalization (equity-to-assets ratio) is significant 
only for the DR model, which might be explained by its being related to bank external 
support factors. 
Given that all the other variables are fixed, the BFSR rating is lower for banks in 
developing markets and even lower for banks in Russia
1. This means that political and 
structural risks are taken into account in BFSR ratings. The influence of those two factors 
(DEV, RUS) is less for DR; clearly, it is smoothed by external support, which is more pro-
nounced in developing countries. This finding is in line with that of Somerville and Taffler, 
(1995), who study Institutional Investor country credit ratings and frequency of arrears on 
external debt-service, and conclude that bankers are overly pessimistic about the creditwor-
thiness of less-developed countries. 
Banks in countries with high levels of corruption have on average lower ratings (re-
call that a low value of TI CPI means a high level of corruption). 
Goodness of fit (pseudo-R
2) is higher for models of BFSR rating (0.36–0.38) than 
for DR rating models (0.24–0.25). This is to be expected, since DR includes by construc-
tion more expert opinions (e.g. external support), and hence should be less suitable for 
modelling with publicly available data than BFSR ratings, which are stand-along ratings. 
 
 
4  Models for external bank support factors 
 
According to Moody’s methodology (Moody’s 2007a,b), a DR rating differs from a BFSR 
rating in terms of “external support” factors. One approach to determining which publicly 
available factors q are important for external support is to simply regress DR on BSFR and 
 
1 We also have made that study for few other developing countries, results are presented at the table 8 in Ap-
pendix. Anatoly Peresetsky and Alexander Karminsky 
 





q. However, the  procedure is made problematic by the fact that both DR and BFSR are 
discrete variables. We therefore resort to a more flexible procedure,  as described below.  
An ordered logit model is formulated as 
 
  * ii yx β ε ′ =+ ,         (1) 
1 () ( * ir i P rating r P c y c − ) r = =< < . 
 
The forecast of the model “index” is  ˆ ˆii yx β ′ =
ˆi z
, which could be considered a latent variable, 
a continuous measure for the rating. Let   and   be estimated latent variables for the DR 
and BFSR ratings respectively. According to Moody’s methodology,   contains informa-
tion from   and additional information on external bank support factors. Thus we can re-
gress   on a function of   and additional regressors (2). Then, if the additional regressors 




ˆi z ˆi y
t q
ˆ ˆ () ii i zf yq i γ ε ′ =+ +       (2)       
Since the function is unknown, we calculate a Taylor expansion of that function of order k , 
the order being determined by the number of statistically significant powers of  :  ˆi y
i
 
01 ˆˆ ˆ ... ( )
k
ii k i i zyy q β ββ γ ′ =+ + + + + ε       
         (3)   
  
The results of regression (3) for  5 k =  are presented in table 3 (β s are not shown); two re-
gressions are presented: (0) without any factors q, and (1) with a set of factors q consisting 
of time and country-specific dummies. One can see that external support is lower in 2007 
(recall that the dummy is related to the time of data observation and the rating is assigned 
18 months later) and is higher for developing than for developed countries. In Russia, ex-
ternal support is even higher than the average support in developing markets. A high R
2 for 
regression (0) shows that BFSR largely determines RD (see table 1).  
Table 3  Models for external support 
 (0)  (1) 
Year 2003  —    0.111**   (0.058) 
Year 2004  —  –0.021       (0.056) 
Year 2005  —    0.462***  (0.154) 
Developing market  —  –0.255**    (0.114) 
Russia  —  –0.873***  (0.105) 
R
2  0.942 0.947 
R
2 adjusted 0.941  0.946 
*,**, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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We use model (1) from table 3 as a benchmark and add additional explanatory variables in 
the functional form 
2
12 i qq γ γ + , assuming the possibility of a nonlinear impact of factor q. 
Then we test the null hypothesis of zero impact:  01 2 : H 0 γ γ = = . Table 4 contains the re-
sults of such regressions, showing only the estimates for  12 , γ γ
1 ˆ
, F-statistic and R
2 . The 
factors are sorted in accordance with volume of impact on external support.  
 
Table 4. Models for external support 
2 ˆ γ   Factor  γ   F-stat  R
2 Support




396 0.971  – 
Problem Loans (%) Gross Loans  –0.069***
 (0.005) 
  0.00001 
 (0.00008) 
278 0.966  + 
Corruption index  –1.088***
 (0.069) 








  0.0028*** 
 (0.0010) 
151 0.960  – 




75 0.954  + 




46.5 0.951  – 
Volatility of economic growth  –0.284***
 (0.104) 
  0.070*** 
 (0.016) 
30.5 0.950  + 




17.7 0.949   
Logarithm of total assets  –0.520***
 (0.112) 




Customer Deposits / Shareholders’ Equity  –0.011 
 (0.015) 
  0.0013* 
 (0.0007) 
6.5 0.947   
*,**, and *** denote significance  at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels; standard errors in brackets. 
 
The last column indicates the direction of impact. Consider, for example, the interest in-
come-to-earning assets ratio. The functional form is actually U-shaped, but the parabola 
vertex is at 48.8, which is much greater than the sample average of 6.8. Hence the larger 
the value of q (earning assets ratio), the larger the value of its impact 
2
12 qq γ γ + and the lo-
wer the external support. We conclude that a high interest income-to-earning assets ratio 
indicates a low level of external support. Similar considerations imply that the relationship 
between bank size and the corruption index is U-shaped. External support is low for high 
and low values of the corruption index. A bank with bad loans needs external support, as 
do banks in countries with high volatility of economic growth. 
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5  Forecasting performance 
 
In this section we study the in-sample forecasting power of the four models for DR and 
BFSR ratings from table 2. It is not clear how best to forecast with an ordered logit model. 
One approach is the following. Given the values of the  i x  indicators, calculate  ˆ ' i x β  and 
then estimate the probabilities  () ( ) ii p r P rating r = =
ˆ
; the forecast of the rating   is that 
which corresponds to the maximum probability:  
ˆ i r
arg ( ) ii rp max r =  — the ML-forecast. 
However, even for the binary logit model, this is not the best forecasting method. It 
leads to the choice of the type 1 outcome if its estimated probability is greater than 0.5. If 
there is a small proportion of type 1 outcomes in the sample, this procedure will produce 
too many faulty forecasts. For this reason, some authors have recommended the use of an-
other threshold (greater than 0.5) in this case.  
Another natural forecasting procedure is to calculate  ˆ ' i x β  and then find the interval 
 that contains it and use  1 [, rr cc − ] r ˆ i r =  as the forecast value (see equation (1)). We call this 
the interval-forecast. 
As expected from the goodness of fit measure (pseudo-R
2), models 1 and 3 have 
slightly better predictive power then models 2 and 4, respectively; hence we show the re-
sults only for models 1 and 3. 
Tables M1a and M1b present the figures for DR rating category forecasts for model 
1 using the ML and interval-forecast methods. Cell entries are numbers of forecasts. For 
example, 31 in column Aa3, row Aa2 means that 31 banks with rating Aa2 were classified 
as banks with rating Aa3 by the ML-forecast method. For the interval-forecast method, the 
number is 22 (table M1b). 
Table M1a reveals the drawbacks of the ML-forecast method: rating categories 
Aaa, Aa1, A1, Baa1, Baa3, Ba1, Ba3 are never forecasted. In terms of the econometrics, 
the reason is that the probabilities for the corresponding intervals   are too 
small relative to other intervals. There are several underlying factors for this. The first is 
the relatively small number of sample observations with corresponding rating categories: 
13 for Aaa, 22 for Aa1, 9 for Baa3, etc. (see table M1c). Hence, ML model estimation is 
“tuned” to other, more frequently observed, ratings. Another factor is that a triple-A rating 
is difficult to forecast because it is assigned only in exceptional circumstances, taking into 
account much informal information that is not accounted for in the model. Rating catego-
1 (* ri Pc y c − << ) rBOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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ries Baa3 and Ba1 are on the borderline between the investment and speculative rating 
classes. The difference between them is crucial for insurance companies and pension foun-
dations, which are allowed to invest only in firms with investment-level ratings. This is 
why there could be a psychological barrier for Moody’s experts in assigning these ratings. 
Similar reasoning could be applied to the Aa1 rating (on the border between the top rating 
classes, Aaa and Aa), A1 (border of the upper investment rating class), and Ba3 (border 
between Ba and B rating classes). 
Table M1b shows that the interval-forecast is almost free from that drawback. Only 
three rating categories (Aaa, Aa1 and Baa3) are never forecasted. The above explanations 
concerning qualitative borders between rating classes are also applicable here. 
Table M1c gives figures for correct ( 0 Δ = ) and correct-within-one-rating category 
(|| ) forecasts. For example, for the most common rating category in the sample, A2, 
the correct forecast percentages are 56.4% (ML-forecast) and 44.8% (interval-forecast); the 
respective correct-within-one-rating category forecast percentages are 64.9% and 84.2%. 
1 Δ≤
The correct rating category forecast percentages are roughly the same for the two 
forecasting methods (ca 32%); for the correct-within-one-rating-category forecasts, the 
figures are 67-69%. 
Table M1d presents the corresponding percentages for forecasts of DR rating 
classes: 61% for correct forecasts and 96% for correct-within-one-rating class forecasts. 
Tables M3a, M3b, M3c, M3d present the BSFR rating forecasts for model 3, ar-
ranged as in tables M1a, M1b, M1c, M1d. Only two ratings categories, A and B-, involve 
the same problem of never being forecasted by the ML method. The percentages for cor-
rect rating categories forecasts are about 44%; for correct-within-one-rating category, 
82%-83%. For the rating classes, the respective percentages are 74–75% and 99.6%. 
On the whole, one can say that the predictive power of the BFSR rating model is 
higher than that of the DR rating model. As mentioned above, this is to be expected since 
BFSR, by construction, reflects the bank’s stand-alone position and includes less qualita-
tive, informal factors than does the DR rating. 
The interval-forecast method seems to outperform the ML-forecast method. 
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6  Conclusions 
 
Econometric models are constructed for two Moody’s bank ratings: Foreign-currency long-
term deposit rating (DR) and Bank Financial Strength Ratings (BFSR). The models use 
only public information and show good prediction power. Therefore, such models could be 
used as a part of early warning systems (EWS) by bank regulators and for the risk evalua-
tion within the IRB framework in the Basel-2 Accord. 
The significant factors in regressions are the factors that are crucial for Moody’s 
methodology: county-specific volatility of economic growth and the corruption index; 
bank-specific size (log of total assets), capital adequacy (customer deposits / shareholders’ 
equity, shareholders’ equity / total assets); assets quality (problem loans / gross loans) effi-
ciency (personnel expenses / operation income), profitability (interest expense / average 
interest bearing liabilities).  
The best prediction power is achieved by models with 12-18 months lag between 
time of observation of factors and time of observation of ratings. 
Given all the other factors, banks from developing countries get lower ratings and 
Russian banks get still lower ratings. It is quite possible that Moody’s takes into account 
political risks in these countries. 
It appears that the negative time trend disappears in models with quantile scales for 
bank-specific factors. This means that the rating agency actually relies not on absolute val-
ues of the bank’s financial indicators, but on their relative values within the whole banking 
system. Hence the observed rating degradation for models with natural scales can be ex-
plained by the growth of the banking system as a whole. 
A methodology for measuring external bank support factors was developed, and the 
most important factors for that support were found. It was demonstrated that banks in de-
veloping countries, and especially in Russia, have higher levels of external support than do 
banks in developing countries. 
Models for FSFR rating have higher predictive power than DR models. The inter-
val-forecast method performs better than the ML forecast method for the constructed or-
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics 
 
 VOLAT  TI  CPI  LTA TA  D_EQ  EQ_TA  PL_GL 
Mean 3.07  5.82  9.414  263073  8.49  7.63  4.63 
Maximum 5.00  9.70 14.239  16334506 26.12  50.51  87.77 
Minimum 1.00  2.1  4.007 107.5  0.00 0.78 0.00 
Std.Dev. 1.35  2.36  1.930  1097524. 4.87  4.81  7.21 
 
 PE_OI  CIBL  YAEA  IE_II 
Mean  0.30 3.92 6.92  55.29 
Maximum 0.69  28.22 46.35 157.1 
Minimum  0.00 0.01 1.29  0.144 





Table 6  Financial indicators (highlighted ones included in models) 
 
Indicator Indicator  Indicator’s 
group 
TA  Total assets ($, mln) 
Size  LTA  Logarithm of total assets 
EQ  Shareholders’ Equity ($, mln) 
YAEA  Interest Income (%) Average Interest Earning Assets 
Profitability 
CIBL  Interest Expense (%) Average Interest Bearing Liabilities 
NIM Net  Interest  Margin 
ROAA  Return on Average Assets (%) 
ROAE  Return on Average Equity (%) 
IE_II  Interest Expense (%) Interest Income 
CIR  Cost to Income Ratio (%)  Efficiency  PE_OI  Personnel Expenses (%) Operation Income 
PL_GL  Problem Loans (%) Gross Loans 
Assets 
Quality 
LLR_GL  Loan Loss Reserve (%) Gross Loans 
PL_EQ_LLR  Problem Loans (%) Shareholders’ Equity + Loan Loss Re-
serve 
T1  Tier 1 ratio (%) 
Capital  
adequacy 
EQ_TA  Shareholders’ Equity (%) Total Assets 
CAR  Capital Adequacy (%) 
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Table 7  Correlations 
 LTA  EQ  YAEA  CIBL  NIM  ROA  ROE  IE_II  CIR 
LTA  1  0.008  –0.364 –0.186 –0.370 –0.291  0.012  0.258  0.160 
EQ  0.008  1  0.133 0.133 0.020 0.018 0.053 0.082  –0.053 
YAEA  –0.364  0.133 1 0.730  0.687  0.451  0.160  –0.048  –0.165 
CIBL  –0.186 0.133 0.730  1  0.240 0.120 0.013 0.496  –0.150 
NIM  –0.370 0.020 0.687 0.240  1  0.763 0.162  –0.426  –0.214 
ROA  –0.291 0.018 0.451 0.120 0.763  1  0.511  –0.334  –0.468 
ROE  0.012 0.053 0.160 0.013 0.162 0.511  1  –0.123  –0.341 
IE_II  0.258  0.082  –0.048  0.496  –0.426 –0.334 –0.123  1  0.060 
CIR  0.160  –0.053 –0.165 –0.150 –0.214 –0.468 –0.341  0.060  1 
PE_OI  0.296  –0.037 –0.248 –0.257 –0.153 –0.320 –0.232 –0.058  0.755 
PL_GL  –0.107 0.150  0.026 –0.005 0.027 –0.083  –0.173  –0.016 0.074 
PL_EQ_LLR  0.123 0.076 0.041 0.036  –0.022  –0.228  –0.253  –0.019  0.135 
T1  –0.296 0.093 0.119 0.078 0.138 0.275 0.078  –0.050  –0.314 
EQ_TA  –0.555  –0.019  0.317 0.055 0.443 0.525 0.082  –0.453  –0.287 
D_EQ  0.248  0.111  –0.101 –0.049 –0.142 –0.237 –0.098  0.093  0.270 
 
 
 PE_OI  PL_GL  PL_EQ_LLR T1  EQ_TA D_EQ 
LTA 0.296  –0.107  0.123  –0.296  –0.555  0.248 
SE –0.037  0.150  0.076  0.093  –0.019  0.111 
YAEA –0.248  0.026  0.041  0.119  0.317  –0.101 
CIBL –0.257  –0.005  0.036  0.078  0.055  –0.049 
NIM –0.153  0.027  –0.022  0.138  0.443  –0.142 
ROA –0.320  –0.083  –0.228  0.275  0.525  –0.237 
ROE –0.232  –0.173  –0.253  0.078  0.082  –0.098 
IE_II –0.058  –0.016  –0.019  –0.050  –0.453  0.093 
CIR 0.755  0.074  0.135  –0.314  –0.287  0.270 
PE_OI 1  –0.063  0.131  –0.336  –0.265  0.309 
PL_GL –0.063  1 0.568  0.057  0.053  0.016 
PL_EQ_LLR 0.131  0.568  1  –0.213 –0.166  0.215 
T1 –0.336  0.057  –0.213  1  0.516  –0.310 
EQ_TA –0.265  0.053  –0.166  0.516  1  –0.434 
D_EQ 0.309  0.016  0.215  –0.310  –0.434  1 
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Table 8  Regression results for BSFR models for other countries 
     (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
     separate  joint    separate  joint 
     natural  natural    quantile  quantile 
Country observations  banks  Coeff, Coeff.  Coeff. Coeff. 

































































From table 2 we concluded that Russia has lower ratings than the other developing coun-
tries, given the other factors. To study whether Russia is an exception, we ran regressions 
for BFSR rating, similar to models 3 and 4 from table 2, substituting the Russia dummy 
with dummies for one of the seven other developing countries. The results are presented at 
table 8. Column (1) shows the results for eight separate regressions in natural scales and 
column (3) those for the same eight regressions in quantile scales. Only the coefficients of 
country dummies and corresponding standard errors in brackets are shown. Columns (2) 
and (4) present results for the two regressions when all eight country dummies are in-
cluded. 
One notes underestimating results for the Kazakhstan and Ukraine ratings, as was 
the case for Russia. Coefficients for those countries are significant and positive, albeit 
lower in value than the coefficient for Russia. The same effect, but even less pronounced, 
was observed for India and Poland. Turkey does not differ from the other developing coun-
tries, but Egypt, and especially Hungary, show the opposite effect (ratings are better than 
average for developing countries, given the other factors). It appears that the rating agency 
experts estimate political and structural risks in post-Soviet countries to be higher than the 
average risks for developing countries. 
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Table M1a  DR model 1, ML forecast 
    Forecasted rating category 
 






















Aaa  0  0 3  10  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aa1 0 0  13  9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aa2 0 0 7  31  0  14  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aa3 0 0  12  62  0  36  3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A1 0  0  1  40  0  45  12  0 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
A2  0  0  2 21 0 97  25 0 16 0  0 11 0  0  0  0 
A3  0 0 0 6 0  78  37  0 6 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
Baa1  0 0 0 1 0  12  30  0  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Baa2  0 0 0 0 0  16  10  0  14  0 0  17  0 2 1 0 
Baa3  0 0 0 0 0 2 7 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0  14  0 1 2 0 
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 8 0 0  48  0 5 0 0 
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 2 0 0  10  0  6 8 0 
B1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0  16  0  17  17 2 
B2  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0  16  0 7  25  2 





Table M1b  DR model 1, interval forecast 
    Forecasted rating category 
























Aaa  0  0 7 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Aa1 0 0  14  3 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Aa2 0 1 8  22  13  8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Aa3 0 0  18  33  45  12  4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
A1 0  0  1  18  41  23  13  2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
A2  0 0 2 7  29  77  18  11  18  0 2 8 0 0 0  0 
A3  0 0 0 3  16  52  41  7 9 0 1 1 0 0 0  0 
Baa1  0 0 0 1 0  10  25  7  1 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Baa2  0 0 0 0 1  12  11  1  18  2 5 7 0 3 0  0 
Baa3  0 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 1  12 1  0  2 0 
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3  12  2 9  34  6 0 0  0 
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 7 6  6 5  0 
B1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 2 7 8  20  12 0 
B2  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4  10  2  15  16  2 
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Table M1c. DR model 1, correct forecast ratio for each rating category 
   Actual  rating  category   
   Aaa Aa1  Aa2  Aa3  A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3  B1 B2 B3 to-
tal
Obs. in catego-
ry  13  22 53  114  103 172 130 44  60  9  20 67 32 54 51 16  960
ML, %  Δ=0  0.0  0.0 13.2  54.4 0.0 56.4 28.5 0.0  23.3 0.0  0.0 71.6 0.0 31.5  49.0  12.5 32.2
Inter-
val, %    0.0  0.0  15.1 28.9 39.8 44.8 31.5 15.9 30.0 0.0  5.0 50.7 18.8 37.0 31.4 12.5 31.7
ML, %  |Δ|≤1  0.0  59.1 71.7 64.9 82.5 70.9 88.5 70.5 23.3 0.0  71.6 71.6 50.0 63.0 62.7 25.0 66.9
Inter-





Table M1d  DR model 1, correct forecast ratio for each rating class 
   Actual  rating  class   
   Aaa  Aa  A  Baa  Ba  B  total 
Obs. in class  13  189  405  113  119  121  960 
ML, %  Δ=0  0.0  70.9 72.6 13.3 60.5 62.0  61.5 
Interval,  %    0.0  52.4 76.5 29.2 63.9 57.0  61.1 
ML, %  |Δ|≤1  100.0  99.5 95.8 96.5 89.9 97.5  96.1 





Table M3a  BFSR model 3, ML forecast 
   Forecasted  rating  category 
























A  0  2 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A– 0  10  4 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B+ 0  2  3  26  0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B  0 0 5  56  0  38  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B–  0 0 0  37  0  34  4 2 0 0 0 0 0 
C+  0 0 0  15  0  77  21  12  0 0 0 0 0 
C  0 0 0 4 0  43  49  27  6 0 1 0 0 
C–  0 0 0 6 0  11  29  40  20  1 0 2 0 
D+  0 0 0 2 0 8 4  14  43  17  4 3 0 
D  0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2  18  32  11 6  0 
D–  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  11  17  14  24 0 
E+  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 9  11  98  0 
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Table M3b  BFSR model 3, Interval forecast 
   Forecasted  rating  category 
























A  0  0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A– 0  6  9 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B+ 0  0  8  20  4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B  0 0 7  40  29  23  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B–  0 0 2  19  26  24  4 2 0 0 0 0 0 
C+  0 0 0  13  8  72  21  11  0 0 0 0 0 
C  0 0 0 3 4  41  49  26  6 0 1 0 0 
C–  0 0 0 4 3  11  31  37  20  1 0 2 0 
D+  0 0 0 2 0 8 5  13  37  23  5 2 0 
D  0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2  11  40  15 1  0 
D–  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7  22  22  15 0 
E+  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3  10  23  86  0 





Table M3c  BFSR model 3, correct forecast ratio for each rating category   
    Actual rating category   
    A  A– B+ B  B– C+ C  C– D+ D  D– E+  E  total 
Obs.  in  category    7  22 34 99 77  125 130 109 95 71 66  122 3  960 
ML, %  Δ=0  0 45 9 57 0 62  38  37  45  45  21  80 0 44.0 
Interval,  %    0  27 24 40 34 58 38 34 39 56 33 70  0  44.1 
ML, %  |Δ|≤1  29 64 91 62 92 78 92 82 78 86 83 89 33 81.8 






Table M3d  BFSR model 3, correct forecast ratio for each rating class 
   Actual  rating  class   
   A B  C  D  E  total 
Obs. in class    29 210 364 232 125 960 
ML, %  Δ=0  41.4  60.5 84.9 72.0 79.2 74.4 
Interval, %    20.7  73.8 82.1 78.4 68.8 75.8 
ML, %  |Δ|≤1  100.0  100.0 99.5  99.1 100.0 99.6 
Interval, %    100.0  100.0 99.5  99.1 100.0 99.6 
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